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Case Note 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LAW 
Yong Vui Kong v PP 
[2010] 3 SLR 489 
The Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 
489 recently addressed at length the issue of the 
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty. In the main, 
the appellant had argued that the mandatory death penalty 
was unconstitutional because it violated Art 9(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed), 
which states that: “No person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty save in accordance with law.” The court 
ultimately rejected this argument. This piece focuses on the 
main international law issue emanating from the said 
constitutional challenge, viz, the relationship between 
international law and domestic law.  
CHEN Siyuan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); 
Justices’ Law Clerk & Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of 
Singapore. 
I. Establishing the context 
1 The appellant in Yong Vui Kong v PP1 (“Yong Vui Kong”) was 
19 years old when he attempted to traffic drugs from Malaysia to 
Singapore. Subsequent to his arrest, he was convicted under the Misuse 
of Drugs Act2 for trafficking in 47.27g of diamorphine,3 a controlled 
drug, and was sentenced to death.4 He challenged his sentence on 
various grounds, but failed in the end. The resulting judgment by the 
Court of Appeal was very rich, dealing with various aspects of 
constitutional law, international law, criminal law and legal theory. This 
note will deal only with the international law issues that emanate from 
the constitutional arguments made by the appellant, viz, the relationship 
between international law and domestic law. 
                                                                 
1 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489. 
2 Cap 185, 2001 Rev Ed. 
3 PP v. Yong Vui Kong [2009] SGHC 4. 
4 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [1]. 
2 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2011) 23 SAcLJ 
 
2 It should be said that this was not the first time that the 
mandatory death penalty in Singapore had been challenged on 
constitutional grounds: previous (and similarly unsuccessful) challenges 
include the Privy Council decision in Ong Ah Chuan v PP5 and the 
Court of Appeal decision in Nguyen Tuong Van v PP.6 Incidentally, 
these two cases were considered in detail by the Court of Appeal in 
Yong Vui Kong.7 And just as in those two cases, the appellant in Yong 
Vui Kong rested his main constitutional argument on Art 9(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (“Constitution”).8 
3 Article 9(1) of the Constitution states that:9 “No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.” 
The expression “law” is defined in Art 2 of the Constitution as 
including “written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom or 
other enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in operation in 
Singapore and the common law in so far as it is in operation in 
Singapore and any custom or usage having the force of law in 
Singapore.”. Article 2(1) also states that “written law” refers to “this 
Constitution and all Acts and Ordinances and subsidiary legislation for 
the time being in force in Singapore”.  
4 The appellant’s argument on Art 9(1) of the Constitution10 that 
is relevant for present purposes was that any mandatory death penalty 
legislation was not “law” for the purposes of Art 9(1), because “law” 
included international law – and according to the appellant, customary 
international law prohibited the mandatory death penalty because it was 
a form of “inhuman punishment”.11 
                                                                 
5 Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] AC 648. 
6 Nguyen Tuong Van v PP [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103. 
7 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489. 
8 1999 Rev Ed. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
10 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
11 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [6]. In this connection, the Court of 
Appeal noted at [7] that: “The Appellant’s challenge to the MDP based on Art 9(1) 
(‘the Article 9(1) challenge’) is targeted at the mandatory nature of the MDP. It 
rests on the premise that, because MDP legislation does not give the court any 
discretion to decide (in view of the circumstances of the case at hand) whether or 
not to impose the death penalty, such legislation ‘treats all persons convicted of a 
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a 
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty 
of death’ (per Stewart J in Woodson et al v North Carolina 428 US 280 (1976) 
(‘Woodson’) at 304). From this perspective, MDP legislation is regarded as being 
inhuman and, thus, antithetical to the right to life set out in Art 9(1). The 
Article 9(1) challenge, if successful, will affect the constitutionality of not only the 
MDP provisions in the MDA, but also all other MDP legislation, such as: (a) s 302 
of the Penal Code … vis-à-vis the offence of murder; (b) s 4 of the Arms Offences 
Act … vis-à-vis the offence of using or attempting to use arms; (c) s 4A of the 
Arms Offences Act vis-à-vis the offence of using or attempting to use arms to 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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II. The decision by the Court of Appeal 
5 In relation to the aforementioned argument, the Court of Appeal 
made the following observations:  
(a) While the appellant asserted that customary 
international law was part of the expression “law” in Art 9(1) of 
the Constitution,12 the appellant cited no authorities for this.13 
In response, the Prosecution accepted that “in principle, the 
expression ‘law’ should be interpreted to include [customary 
international law]”.14 The Court of Appeal, however, resisted 
this and noted the wider ramifications if it was true that “law” 
in Art 9(1) included customary international law: “We do not 
think that the AG, by this reply, was conceding that the 
expression ‘law’ in Art 9(1) includes CIL in the sense that ‘law’ 
has been defined to include CIL, with the consequence that, 
once it is shown that there is a rule of CIL prohibiting the MDP 
as an inhuman punishment, that CIL rule automatically 
becomes part of ‘law’ for the purposes of Art 9(1). Indeed, the 
constitutional definition of ‘law’ in Art 2(1) is quite different … 
Besides, such a concession would be contrary to the decision 
in Nguyen, where this court held at [94], citing (inter alia) the 
Privy Council case of Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] 
AC 160 … that in the event of a conflict between a rule of CIL 
and a domestic statute, the latter would prevail. From his other 
submissions, it seems clear enough to us that what the AG 
meant when he said that the expression ‘law’ should be 
interpreted to include CIL was that this expression would 
include a CIL rule which had already been recognised and 
applied by a domestic court as part of Singapore law”.15 
(b) Domestic law, including the Constitution, should, “as 
far as possible, be interpreted consistently with Singapore’s 
international legal obligations. There are, however, inherent 
limits on the extent to which our courts may refer to 
international human rights for this purpose. For instance, 
reference to international human rights norms would not be 
appropriate where the express wording of the Singapore 
Constitution is not amenable to the incorporation of those 
                                                                                                                     
commit or to attempt to commit an offence listed in the Schedule of the Act; and 
(d) s 58(1) of the Internal Security Act … vis-à-vis the offence of having or 
carrying, without lawful excuse and without lawful authority, any firearm, 
ammunition or explosive in a security area …” 
12 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
13 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [43]. 
14 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [44]. 
15 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [44]. 
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international norms … for our courts to give effect to [such 
norms], it would be necessary Parliament to first enact new 
laws (as the drafters of the [Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights] hoped States would do) or even amend the Singapore 
Constitution to expressly provide for rights which have not 
already been incorporated therein”.16 
(c) It was not possible to incorporate a prohibition against 
inhuman punishment through the interpretation of Art 9(1) of 
the Constitution because: (i) the Constitution does not contain 
any express prohibition against inhuman punishment;17 (ii) the 
European Convention of Human Rights18 (“ECHR”) (which 
certain Commonwealth states subsequently modelled their 
constitutions after) had ceased to apply in British colonies upon 
their independence;19 (iii) when the 1957 Malayan Constitution 
(which heavily influenced the part on fundamental liberties in 
our Constitution) was drafted, no reference or recommendation 
was made vis-à-vis a prohibition against inhuman punishment 
even though the Reid Commission knew of the ECHR;20 
(iv) there was again an omission of the prohibition against 
inhuman punishment from the 1963 Malaysian Constitution (a 
later version of the 1957 Malayan Constitution, which also 
heavily influenced the part on fundamental liberties in our 
Constitution);21 and (v) a proposal by the Wee Chong Jin 
Commission in 1966 to add an express constitutional provision 
(Art 13) prohibiting torture or inhuman punishment was 
unambiguously rejected by the Government.22 The proposed 
Art 13 was the same as Art 3 of the ECHR.23 
(d) States are “not bound to give effect in their 
Constitutions to norms and standards elsewhere”,24 and if “the 
requisite legislative support for a change in the Constitution is 
forthcoming, a deliberate departure from fundamental human 
rights may be made, profoundly regrettable although this may 
be. That is the prerogative of the legislature”.25 There is, “in 
substance, no difference between repealing an existing 
constitutional provision prohibiting inhuman punishment and 
                                                                 
16 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489  at [59]. 
17 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [61]. 
18 European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 1950), 213 UNTS 221 
(“ECHR”. 
19 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489  at [61]. 
20 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [62]. 
21 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [62]. 
22 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [64]–[65], [72] and [92]. 
23 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [66]. 
24 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [73]. 
25 Citing Matthew v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433 at [73]. 
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deliberately deciding not to enact such a constitutional 
provision in the first place” [emphasis in original].26 
(e) Once a customary international norm has been 
incorporated by the domestic courts into the domestic laws, it 
becomes part of the common law. The common law, however, 
is subordinate to statute law. If the expression “law” in Art 9(1) 
of the Constitution includes customary international law, “the 
hierarchy of legal rules would be reversed: any rule of 
[customary international law] that is received via the common 
law would be cloaked with constitutional status and would 
nullify any statute or any binding judicial precedent which is 
inconsistent with it”.27 
(f) A rule of customary international law is not self-
executing; “it cannot become part of domestic law until and 
unless it has been applied as or definitively declared to be part 
of domestic law by a domestic court. The expression ‘law’ is 
defined in Art 2(1) to include the common law only ‘in so far as 
it is in operation in Singapore’ … given the existence of the 
[mandatory death penalty] in several of our statutes, our courts 
cannot treat the alleged [customary international law] rule 
prohibiting inhuman punishment as having been incorporated 
into Singapore law”.28 
(g) If there is a conflict between a rule of customary 
international law and a domestic statute, the latter prevails.29 
III. Some comments on the decision 
6 As alluded to earlier, it is impossible within the confines of this 
note to review every aspect of the judgment, so this note will only focus 
on the international law issues that emanate from the constitutional 
arguments made by the appellant. While it is submitted that the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Yong Vui Kong30 in this regard is generally sound 
and uncontroversial, the decision could have benefitted from a more 
complete discourse by bringing in and discussing various orthodox 
strands of thought in contemporary international law. 
                                                                 
26 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [74]. 
27 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [87]–[90]. 
28 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [91]. 
29 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [91]. 
30 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489. 
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A. Whether “law” includes customary international law – monist 
and dualist approaches 
7 A local commentator once pointed out: “While [the 
Constitution] is silent in key respects on the interaction between 
international law and the Singapore domestic legal system, the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches in Singapore have all 
demonstrated a keen appreciation of what international law requires and 
allows.”31 Indeed, in the aftermath of Nguyen Tuong Van v PP,32 it was 
commented that if the expression “law” in Art 9(1) of the Constitution33 
included rules of customary international law, this would make “the 
Singapore Constitution a closer cousin of the American and German 
Constitutions than that of the United Kingdom. That this would fly in 
the face of our normal practice and understanding of the relationship 
between international law and Singapore law is without doubt”.34 It was 
further commented that:35 
Furthermore, if by ‘international law’ (in this argument) we also mean 
to include treaty laws, an unbearable tension would be created with 
Article 38 [of the Constitution], which vests the legislative power of 
Singapore in the ‘Legislature which shall consist of the President and 
Parliament’. The retort here may simply be that this in fact creates no 
greater tension than that of which necessarily exists between, say, 
Article 38 and Article 93 (the judicial power of Singapore), and which 
has never been viewed to be especially problematic in practice. 
[footnote omitted] 
8 That the Constitution36 includes reference to international law 
has been referred to as the “monist approach” (or monism) – that is, 
international law and domestic/municipal law are but parts of a single 
system, and the mere act of ratification immediately incorporates the 
international legal obligation into domestic law.37 Insofar as this is 
concerned, local commentators seem to agree that given what is written 
(and what is not written) in the Constitution, the “dualist approach” (or 
                                                                 
31 Lim Chin Leng, “Singapore and International Law, 
<http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content/IntLaw.html> (accessed 3 January 2011). 
32 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103. 
33 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
34 Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International 
Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 226.  
35 Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International 
Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 226. See also 
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurt’s Modern Introduction to International Law (US: 
Routledge, 7th Ed,1997) at pp 63–74. 
36 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
37 See, eg, Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary 
International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 
227. 
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dualism) appears to be the one that is more relevant in Singapore,38 that 
is, there is no “automatic” reception or incorporation of international 
law39 – and in the case of international treaty law, Art 38 of the 
Constitution vests the lawmaking power in the Legislature, and not the 
Executive.40 So the issue is really the reception of customary 
international law. To this end, it has been argued that the concept of the 
maintenance of the separation of powers is highly relevant to the 
discussion:41 
No-one argues against the view that the power to conduct foreign 
affairs is vested in the Executive. Could the Constitution be taken to 
imply this? If so, then it may be thought that such power includes the 
power to determine Singapore’s attitude towards particular rules of 
customary international law. Judges then may, at best, only go so far 
as to discover customary international law as part of the common-law 
in Singapore. The courts should not decide Singapore’s position under 
customary international law without reference to the Executive … say 
that the Constitution imports a particular customary rule, and strike 
down Parliamentary legislation for contradicting that rule (and 
therefore the Constitution) … 
The courts may scrutinise legislation for conformity with the 
Constitution where the meaning given to constitutional provisions 
may be derived by a variety of means of legal reasoning, but not 
where such scrutiny is had purely by reference to what the courts 
alone consider to be an existing international legal standard. The 
courts must be wary of a hidden usurpation of the legitimate exercise 
(or non-exercise) of the foreign affairs powers of the Republic of 
Singapore [footnote omitted], which surely includes the foreign 
affairs power to define and determine Singapore’s attitude towards 
regulation by a particular international customary rule. The courts 
cannot go there because this power belongs to the Executive [footnote 
omitted]. Put simply, the application of such international standards 
may affect the proper separation of the executive power in foreign 
affairs and the judicial power in Singapore. 
                                                                 
38 See, eg, Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary 
International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 
228–229; Thio Li-ann, “The Death Penalty as Cruel and Inhuman Punishment 
Before the Singapore High Court? Customary Human Rights Norms, 
Constitutional Formalism and the Supremacy of Domestic Law in PP v Nguyen 
Tuong Van (2004)” 4 OUCLJ 1 at 10–11; and Simon Tay, “The Singapore Legal 
System and International Law: Influence or Interference?” in The Singapore Legal 
System (Kevin Tan ed) (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2nd Ed, 1998) 
p 467 at p 472. The monist and dualist regimes are the two most predominant 
regimes in international law today. 
39 See also Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [91]. 
40 See also Lim Chin Leng, “Singapore and International Law, 
<http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content/IntLaw.html> (accessed 3 January 2011). 
41 Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International 
Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 229–231. 
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It might be objected, firstly, that it is for the courts to declare the 
meaning of the Constitution. If so … it is not for the Executive to say 
what customary international law (as part of the Singapore 
Constitution) looks like. However … the courts, in choosing to 
interpret the Constitution one way or another, would nonetheless not 
do so arbitrarily. Judicial decisions must, after all, rest on legal 
reasoning and legal principle. What is the true legal principle to be 
applied in such cases then? Simply put, the courts and the Executive 
should speak with “one voice” [footnote omitted] … 
It might still be objected that the present line of argument makes a 
mockery of the fundamental liberties … After all, it seems to make 
little sense to say that the Constitution is supreme [footnote omitted], 
while saying at the same time the courts should defer to the Executive 
where the Constitution requires (ex hypothesi) the application of 
international law in ensuring respect for the fundamental liberties … 
The simple answer here is that the fundamental liberties may still be 
given breadth and meaning by other means … that would achieve the 
same result. 
[emphasis in original] 
9 It is submitted that the views espoused in the preceding 
paragraphs on the monist–dualist distinction and the separation of 
powers are correct, and could have been used to elucidate and fortify 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong,42 which did not 
go into any express discussion of monism and dualism (although it 
highlighted the concept of separation of powers).43 This is especially so 
since the court’s judgment could potentially have given the impression 
that all rules of customary international law are not self-executing in 
any legal system,44 and that if such rules were indeed self-executing, 
they would subvert the vertical hierarchy of the domestic (common 
law) legal system.45 It should also be noted that there may actually be at 
least one exception to the dualist approach, and that is when an 
international norm falls under the very narrow realm of jus cogens.46 
But as things stand, common examples (such as slavery and genocide) 
cited for jus cogens are few and far between, and there is no reason or 
evidence at this point in time (or anytime soon) to believe that the 
                                                                 
42 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489. 
43 How international law and domestic law interact remains a live international law 
issue throughout the world with much room for further discourse, as highlighted 
by President of the International Court of Justice Owada during the 2010 
Singapore Academy of Law Annual Lecture: Singapore Academy of Law Annual 
Lecture 
<http://www.sal.org.sg/Lists/Latest%20SAL%20Happenings/DispForm.aspx?ID=
30> (forthcoming). 
44 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [91]. 
45 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489 at [87]–[90]. 
46 Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International 
Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 231. 
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mandatory death penalty should be brought into that narrow class of 
examples.47 
B. Actual requirements and expectations of international law 
10 The actual requirements and expectations of the international 
law regime should also have been considered and expressly discussed. 
For one, it may be said that international law is not concerned with how 
customary international norms are implemented by the various states. 
This may partly explain why the dualist approach is purportedly still the 
approach taken by the majority of Commonwealth jurisdictions48 – 
although there are supposedly signs that this is gradually changing.49 
For another, while international law is binding on states, and states are 
obligated to give effect to their international legal obligations, 
international law does not replace or supersede the domestic law of 
states.50 Moreover, while international law depends on the governments 
of states and their constitutional and legal systems for the adherence to 
and enforcement of international law, the obligation to respect and give 
effect to international law is upon the State, and not upon any particular 
branch or body of the Government.51 It is the State, as a whole, which 
is responsible to ensure its constitution and its laws enable its 
government to duly perform its international legal obligations.52 Having 
                                                                 
47 See Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 
2009) at pp 55–112. 
48 Lim Chin Leng, “Singapore and International Law, 
<http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content/IntLaw.html> (accessed 3 January 2011).  
49 See, eg, Michael Kirby, “The Growing Rapprochement Between International Law 
and National Law” < 
http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_weeram.htm > (accessed 25 
January 2011). Whether the shift is towards monism, however, remains unclear. 
See also The Bangalore Principles 
<http://www.genderandtrade.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BA2407AAC-
A477-491D-ABA4-
A2CADF227E2B%7D_BANGALORE%20PRINCIPLES.pdf> (accessed 
3 January 2011). 
50 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at p 652. 
51 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at p 652. 
52 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at p 652 at pp 652–654. See also Medellin v Texas (2008) 128 S Ct 1346 at 1356: 
“[W]hile treaties ‘may comprise international commitments ... they are not 
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the 
treaty itself conveys an intention that if be “self-executing” and is ratified on these 
terms’ ... A treaty is, of course, ‘primarily a compact between independent nations’ 
... It ordinarily ‘depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and 
honor of the governments which are parties to it’ ... ‘If these [interests] fail, its 
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations ... It 
is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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said that, all of the above – effectively encapsulated by the term the 
“black-box theory of international law” – has been called into question 
in recent times.53 The main force agitating this change appears to be a 
recent growing global demand for an increase in the effectiveness of 
international law.54 Nevertheless, there is no compelling indication at 
this point in time that the “black-box” theory is about to be significantly 
discredited anytime soon, and therefore, the prevailing orthodoxy is that 
the responsibility to adhere to international legal obligations falls on the 
State, and not on any of its organs. 
11 At any rate, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal in Yong Vui 
Kong55 could have pointed out that both the monist and dualist regimes 
are equally capable of ensuring that a state’s international law 
obligations are complied with – because on one view, the most one can 
say is that a monist regime is possibly less at risk of violating 
international legal obligations because its judiciary can, in principle, 
apply international law directly.56 On another view, however, it has been 
said that “[while in the monist] jurisdictions international law will be 
treated as a familiar topic, one that both the judge and the counsel 
before will expect to deal with on a routine basis … there is another 
culture that exists [usually in the dualist jurisdictions], in which it is 
possible to become a practising lawyer without having studied 
international law, and indeed to become a judge without knowing 
international law. Psychologically that predisposes both counsel and 
judge to treat international law as some exotic branch of the law, to be 
avoided if at all possible, and to be looked upon as if it is unreal, of no 
practical application in the real world”.57 The response to the latter view 
                                                                                                                     
redress.’ ... the UN Charter does not contemplate the automatic enforceability of 
ICJ decisions in domestic courts.” 
53 See, eg, Ward Ferdinandusse, “Out of the Black-Box? The International 
Obligation of State Organs” (2003) 29 Brook J Int’l L 45. 
54 Ward Ferdinandusse, “Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of State 
Organs” (2003) 29 Brook J Int’l L 45 at 47. 
55 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] SLR 489. 
56 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (UK: Clarendon Press, 
1994) at pp 14–16; Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Volume 1 (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at p 153. 
57 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(UK: Oxford University Press, 1994) at p 206 [Problems and Process]. Higgins 
went on to add at p 218: “The opportunity for [states] to examine international law 
matters is significantly reduced in dualist systems whereby interpretation and 
application of treaties is broadly permissible only when the treaty has been directly 
incorporated.” See also Harold Koh, “Transnational Public Law Litigation” (1991) 
100 Yale LJ 2347 at 2349: “A strictly dualist view denies a meaningful role to 
both individuals and domestic courts in the making of international law. In a 
dualistic system, individuals injured by foreign states would have no right to 
pursue claims directly against those states in either domestic or international fora. 
Instead, their states would pursue those claims for them on a discretionary basis in 
international for a …” 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ International law and domestic law 11 
 
is that cases like Nguyen Tuong Van v PP58 and Yong Vui Kong will 
perhaps show that insofar as Singapore is concerned, our courts are not 
totally averse to (or incapable of) discourses on international law in 
their judgments, nor have they (recently at least) treated international 
law contemptuously as an alien subject matter.59  
C. Utility and relevance of the Bangalore Principles 
12 What if we conceive of international law as having a different 
role instead? For instance, the Bangalore Principles (which were not 
mentioned in Yong Vui Kong), as originally conceived, state that: “In 
most countries whose legal systems are based upon common law, 
international conventions are not directly enforceable in domestic 
courts unless their provisions have been incorporated by legislation into 
domestic law. However, there is a growing tendency for national courts 
to have regard to these international norms for the purpose of deciding 
cases where the domestic law – whether constitutional, statute, or 
common law – is uncertain or incomplete.”60 While this seems like a 
palatable hybrid solution, there are some problems. 
13 First, the conception that international law has some sort of 
interpretive role to play comes to the fore most strongly within the 
international human rights context.61 If anything, there have been 
indications (from the Government, at least) that Singapore does not 
necessarily subscribe to a universalised understanding of all human 
rights.62 The Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong also alluded to the fact 
                                                                 
58 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 at [84]–[92]. 
59 Cf Thio Li-ann, “Pragmatism and Realism do not Mean Abdication: A Critical and 
Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International Human Rights 
Law” (2004) SYBIL 41 at 58–59. 
60 The Bangalore Principles 
<http://www.genderandtrade.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BA2407AAC-
A477-491D-ABA4-
A2CADF227E2B%7D_BANGALORE%20PRINCIPLES.pdf> (accessed 
3 January 2011). 
61 The Bangalore Principles 
<http://www.genderandtrade.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BA2407AAC-
A477-491D-ABA4-
A2CADF227E2B%7D_BANGALORE%20PRINCIPLES.pdf> (accessed 
3 January 2011). 
62 See, eg, Thio Li-ann, “Pragmatism and Realism do not Mean Abdication: A 
Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International 
Human Rights Law” (2004) SYBIL 41 at 43–59; Wong Kan Seng, “The Real 
World of Human Rights” [1993] SJLS 605. Though he may not have spoken on 
behalf of the nation, Professor Walter Woon did once say, while he was Attorney-
General, that foreigners who harbour the “delusion that they define human rights 
for the rest of humanity” should be called “fanatics”: see Lydia Lim, “Human 
rights’ label often abused” The Straits Times (4 July 2008) available online: 
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that judicial reference to international human rights will be, in many 
instances, quite heavily circumscribed, particularly if the Constitution63 
does not expressly provide for such rights.64 Second, uncertainty, 
inconsistency and incompleteness exist not only in degrees, but also in 
types. For the same domestic norm and international norm being 
compared, some may, for instance, consider the difference (conceptual 
or otherwise) to be so fundamental that there is no valid basis for 
comparison. Others may consider the difference to be a mere matter of 
slight inconsistency, or any asymmetry between an international norm 
and a domestic norm to be an absolute barrier to the introduction of the 
international norm, or that either norm is framed too vaguely or too 
broadly such that it only has aspiratory value and is not necessarily 
binding. The Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong, for instance, has 
already said that “reference to international human rights norms would 
not be appropriate where the express wording of the Singapore 
Constitution is not amenable to the incorporation of those international 
norms”.65 The term “amenable” is conceivably very broad (and maybe 
vague), and ultimately situates the Singapore position firmly in the 
dualist school, rendering the applicability and utility of the Bangalore 
Principles uncertain. Third, the Bangalore Principles have existed for a 
substantial period of time, but they remain relatively untested norms, 
and until they are affirmed or their nuances brought out more clearly on 
a truly notable platform, their relevance and pedigree arguably remain 
suspect. 
D. Where there is a conflict between international law and 
domestic law 
14 This is a related but separate issue from whether international 
law is automatically received in Singapore. Both Nguyen Tuong Van v 
PP66 and Yong Vui Kong said, unequivocally, that statute would prevail 
if there is a conflict between statute and customary international law.67 
In other words, “an international rule received into Singapore law by 
way of the common law remains subject to the contrary demands of 
statute and the Constitution in Singapore”.68 A qualifier can be added to 
this, in that “only if certain rules of customary international law are not 
imported into the words of the constitution … In such a case, the 
                                                                                                                     
<http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,10534,> (accessed 3 January 
2011).  
63 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
64 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [59]. 
65 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [59]. 
66 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103. 
67 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [91]. 
68 Lim Chin Leng, “Singapore and International Law, 
<http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content/IntLaw.html> (accessed 3 January 2011). 
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constitutional provision would prevail over an inconsistent statutory 
provision”.69  
15 Because this principle (domestic statutory law prevailing when 
there is a conflict) appears consistent with a dualist regime, it would 
again have been more helpful if the court had alluded to or discussed 
the monist-dualist distinction, as well as the accompanying 
implications. It seems apparent that a monist regime and a dualist 
regime would likely have different answers to the question as to what 
happens when international law and domestic law conflict – that is just 
the practical reality of the matter. As Rosalyn Higgins once put it:70 
Whichever view you take [monism or dualism], there is still the 
problem of which system prevails when there is a clash between the 
two. One can give answers to that question at the level of legal 
philosophy; but in the real world the answer often depends upon the 
tribunal answering it … and upon the question asked. The 
International Court of Justice has indicated [eg, in the Nottebohm 
Case]71 that for it domestic law is a fact. On some matters even an 
international court will need to apply this law … But when the issue is 
whether an international obligation can be avoided, or excused, 
because of a deficiency or contradiction in domestic law, then for an 
international tribunal the answer is clear – it cannot, and the 
obligation in international law remains. The domestic court may be 
faced with a difficult question, when the domestic law which is its 
day-to-day task to apply entails a violation of an international 
obligation. Domestic courts do address that problem differently. 
Leaving the theoretical aspects aside for a moment, it is as a practical 
matter difficult to persuade a national court to apply international law, 
rather than the domestic, if there appears to be a clash between the 
two. But it is more possible in some courts than in others … the 
difference in response to a clash of international law and domestic law 
in various domestic courts is substantially conditioned by whether the 
country is monist or dualist in its approach. [emphasis in original] 
16 Indeed, under the monist theory in which “law” is seen as one 
entity comprising national and international law, where there is conflict 
between international law and domestic law, international law is 
supposed to be, on one view at least, supreme. An example of a 
proponent of such a view is perhaps the renowned positivist and 
international law scholar Hans Kelsen, who considers the supremacy of 
international law as simply a logical consequence of his concept of the 
                                                                 
69 Lim Chin Leng, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International 
Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor” [2005] SJLS 218 at 227. 
70 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(UK: Oxford University Press, 1994) at pp 205–206. 
71  Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), 1955 WL 1 (ICJ 1955). 
14 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2011) 23 SAcLJ 
 
grundnorm,72 in that international law represents a higher legal order 
because it is derived from state practice and domestic law is but derived 
from the states as established in international law.73 Then there are the 
likes of Hersch Lauterpacht and other proponents of universal human 
rights, who consider the supremacy of international law as necessary 
because it (theoretically) provides the best guarantee for the protection 
of human rights and liberties for individuals – and this, of course, is 
built on the idea that the State is a collection of individuals rather than 
an abstract and single entity.74 Thirdly, there is the natural law 
conception – the supposed genesis of international law and indeed 
international human rights75 – which proposes a vertical hierarchy of 
natural law, international law and domestic law. Under this conception 
– and paradoxically coming to the same conclusion as the positivist 
Kelsen – international law will naturally prevail if it conflicts with 
domestic law.76 The departure from Kelsen and positivism, presumably, 
is that natural law will not trump international law because natural law, 
if it even exists, is not “law” in the sense of being part of any legal 
system. 
17 But while the principle of domestic law prevailing over 
international law is compatible with a dualist regime, it remains a trite 
                                                                 
72 For Kelsen, “an act or an event gains its legal-normative meaning by another legal 
norm that confers this normative meaning on it. An act can create or modify the 
law if it is created in accordance with another, ‘higher’ legal norm that authorizes 
its creation in that way. And the ‘higher’ legal norm, in turn, is legally valid if and 
only if it has been created in accord with yet another, ‘higher’ norm that authorizes 
its enactment in that way”: see Andrei Marmor, “The Pure Theory of Law” 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/> (accessed 3 Janaury 2011). 
73 For Kelsen, “an act or an event gains its legal-normative meaning by another legal 
norm that confers this normative meaning on it. An act can create or modify the 
law if it is created in accordance with another, ‘higher’ legal norm that authorizes 
its creation in that way. And the ‘higher’ legal norm, in turn, is legally valid if and 
only if it has been created in accord with yet another, ‘higher’ norm that authorizes 
its enactment in that way”: see Andrei Marmor, “The Pure Theory of Law” 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/> (accessed 3 Janaury 2011). This 
view is not without its problems: for example, if Kelsen is correct, there can 
effectively only be one basic (public international law) norm in the whole world. 
74 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (UK: Clarendon Press, 
1994)at p 17; A F M Maniruzzaman, “State Contracts in Contemporary 
International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies” (2001) EJIL 309 at 312–
313. 
75 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at pp xix–xxx; Brian Opeskin, “Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of 
International Law in Commonwealth Countries: Part 1” (2000) Public Law 2000, 
607 at 615. 
76 Brian Opeskin, “Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of International 
Law in Commonwealth Countries: Part 1” (2000) Public Law 2000, 607 at 615; 
Emeka Duruigbo, “Corporate Accountability and Liability for International 
Human Rights Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges” (2008) 6 Nw 
U J Int’l Hum Rts 222 at para 27. 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ International law and domestic law 15 
 
principle in public international law that a state cannot plead its own 
domestic law as a reason or excuse for non-compliance with its 
international legal obligations.77 Again, it seems that as a first step to 
reconcile the relationships, we are forced into the unintuitive distinction 
mentioned above between international obligations on a state as a 
whole, and international obligations on a particular branch or organ of a 
state.78 And building on the monism-dualism distinction discussed 
earlier, it will be remiss not to put another (possibly radical) possibility 
on the table that will shed more light on this situation of conflicting 
international and domestic norms. Mann and Fitzmaurice have 
proposed, separately – perhaps as an extreme application of dualism – 
that international law and domestic law simply do not operate in the 
same realm, and because of that, conflict between them is a moot 
point.79 Supremacy thus refers only to the apex of the respective fields; 
the corollary of which is that any apparent conflict in the domestic field 
is automatically settled by the domestic conflict rules of the forum and 
any conflict in the international field would be resolved by international 
law.80 Taking a leaf from the field of conflict of laws (or private 
international law), they further posit that it is useless to discuss the 
supremacy of international law in the international law field as supreme 
simply because of the fact that it is the only law that there is. It is 
supremacy not arising from the content but from the field of 
operation.81 President Hisashi Owada of the International Court of 
Justice, however, recently opined that he remains convinced that 
monism and dualism are the only legitimate and realistic schools of 
thought in this matter.82 
                                                                 
77 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at p 652. 
78 Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy & Smidt, International Law (US: West, 5th Ed, 2009) 
at p 652 at pp 652–654. See also Medellin v Texas (2008) 128 S Ct 1346 at 1356: 
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79 A F M Maniruzzaman, “State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: 
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80 A F M Maniruzzaman, “State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: 
Monist versus Dualist Controversies”, (2001) EJIL 309 at 320–322. 
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E. An argument from analogy of the rules of natural justice? 
18 Finally, as a point distinct from the prior discussions on 
international law per se, since the question here of what “law” in 
Art 9(1) of the Constitution83 entails (viz, whether it includes 
international law) is essentially a definitional issue, it may be helpful to 
consider how “law” has been defined in other (non-international law) 
contexts. In Ong Ah Chuan v PP, in relation to whether “law” could 
simply encompass any statute passed by Parliament, however arbitrary 
or contrary to fundamental rules of natural justice the provisions of such 
a statute might be, the Privy Council stated that references to “law” in 
the Constitution incorporated “fundamental rules of natural justice that 
had formed part and parcel of the common law of England that was in 
operation in Singapore at the commencement of the Constitution”.84 
The Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong, however, observed that the 
Privy Council was unclear as to what sort of legislation would actually 
not qualify as “law” for the purposes of Art 9(1).85 The Court of Appeal 
therefore postulated that: “Perhaps, the Privy Council had in mind 
colourable legislation which purported to enact a ‘law’ as generally 
understood (ie, a legislative rule of general application), but which in 
effect was a legislative judgment, that is to say, legislation directed at 
securing the conviction of particular known individuals … or 
legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly 
have been contemplated by our constitutional framers as being ‘law’ 
when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental 
liberties”.86 
19 On the one hand, the continued (local) judicial affirmation of 
Ong Ah Chuan v PP87 may be seen as a door left half-open to further 
expand the definition of “law” in Arts 2 and 9(1) of the Constitution,88 
for instance to include other unwritten aspects such as customary 
international law. On the other hand and on a close reading of Yong Vui 
Kong, however, the Court of Appeal was only prepared to maintain the 
extended definition of statutory law, and not law in general. Its 
interpretation of Ong Ah Chuan v PP also seems to suggest a narrow 
extension of the definition of statutory law, rather than a broad 
extension, viz, a specific category of laws that do not conform to the 
                                                                                                                     
<http://www.sal.org.sg/Lists/Latest%20SAL%20Happenings/DispForm.aspx?ID=
30> (forthcoming). 
83 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
84 Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] AC 648 at 670. 
85 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [16]. 
86 Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [16]. 
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Nguyen Tuong Van v PP [2005] 1 SLR(R) 103 at [82]. 
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rules of natural justice.89 In view of this, and in line with the Judiciary’s 
traditional preference to be more positivistic and history-inquiring (in 
its constitutional interpretations),90 and non-interfering in the provinces 
of the Legislature, it seems that the application of Ong Ah Chuan v PP 
is fairly specific and limited in understanding if “law” in Arts 2 and 
9(1) of the Constitution can include international law. 
IV. Conclusion 
20 Yong Vui Kong may well be the final word in a long time on the 
judicial application of international law.91 Accordingly, its analysis vis-
à-vis international law would have been made even more robust with 
clearer discussions on contemporary and orthodox strands of thought in 
international law, such as the monism-dualism distinction, the 
consequences of such a distinction, the actual requirements and 
expectations of performing international legal obligations, and even the 
relevance of the Bangalore Principles. If anything, this might have 
achieved some mileage in dispelling any perceptions that dualist 
jurisdictions are reluctant to consider international law more thoroughly 
in their judicial decisions. 
 
                                                                 
89 Cf its insistence that Jabar bin Kandermastan v PP [1995] 1 SLR(R) 326 
(“Jabar”) was consistent with Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] AC 648 and Nguyen 
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90 See, eg, the preceding section in this note. 
91 See also Yong Vui Kong v PP [2010] 3 SLR 489 at [123]. 
